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Rhetoric  of  Youth,    
or  Bridges  to  Nowhere  
Thomas    Harrison  
Architectonically   speaking,   there   comes  a   stage   in   life   that   looks  
like  a  house.  Everything  appears  already  built  up,  all   filled  with  kids  
and  furniture,  functionally  disposed  in  interconnected  spaces.  The  age  
of  adulthood.  Childhood  instead  is  a  playground,  with  apparatuses  for  
swinging   and   climbing   and   an   open   court   to   serve   their   somewhat  
anarchic  whims.  What   leads   to   the  adult  house   is  a  road,  which  most  
people   embark   on   in   their   twenties,   as   they   decide  what   to   do  with  
their   lives.  But  before  one   finds   this   road  one  needs   to  pass  a  bridge:  
the   architectonics   of   youth,   which,   as   I   understand   it   in   this   paper,  
entails  a  passage  between  two  distinct  terrains,  each  more  distinct  than  
the  passage  between  them:  childhood  and  adulthood.  Youth  is  not  the  
road   to   the  house  of   adulthood,  which   is  discovered   later;   youth   is   a  
bridge,  taking  us  to  a  place  from  which  many  roads  start.  Committing  
to  an  adult  project  means  choosing  one  of  them.  
In   concrete   fact,   life   is   composed   of   many   bridges,   and   often  
where  we  least  expect  them.  One  avoids  them  only  by  dying,  and  then,  
of   course,  at   the  cost  of   staring  another,   colossal,  bridge   in   the   face—
perhaps   the   same  one  we  crossed  unconsciously,   and   in   the  opposite  
direction,  by  being  born.  Even  so,  the  development  of  an  individual  life  
usually   posits   a   major   crossing   between   two   big   banks   that   Freud  
synthetically  characterized  as  governed,  one,  by  the  pleasure  principle,  
and  the  other  by  the  principle  of  reality.  The  idea  is  that  children,  if  left  
to  their  own  devices,  would  devote  themselves  entirely  to  seeking  their  
own   pleasure.   Adults,   instead,   have   come   to   accept   that   they   can  
pursue  and  obtain  pleasure  only  after  respecting  the  hard  facts  of  life,  
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including   the   need   to   work   and   to   frequently   defer   amusements’  
enticements.  Youth  is  the  passage  from  one  of  these  orders  to  the  other.  
Different  cultures  conceive  of  this  crossing  differently,  assigning  it  
different  times  and  tasks  in  life.  The  more  open  a  society,  which  means  
the  more  options  it  affords  its  members,  the  more  bridge-­‐‑like  its  youth  
would  seem1.  When  there  are  many  roads  one  can  take  as  an  adult,  and  
many  houses   to   choose   from,   the  bridgework  depends   largely  on   the  
initiative  of  an  individual  subject.  Building  the  bridge  amounts  to  self-­‐‑
testing  and  self-­‐‑discovery,  both  key  features  of  an  age  which,  according  
to   the   master   psychologist   of   youth,   Erik   Erikson,   is   a   kind   of  
interregnum  or  state  of  suspension  between  two  more  coherent  blocks  
of  life:  «The  adolescent  mind  is  essentially  a  mind  of  the  moratorium,  a  
psychosocial  stage  between  childhood  and  adulthood,  and  between  the  
morality   learned   by   the   child   and   the   ethics   to   be   developed   by   the  
adult»   (Erikson   1963:   262-­‐‑263).   Through   a   process   of   exploration,  
experience,   growth   and   pain2,   the   purpose   of   youth   is   identity  
formation.   One   achieves   that   purpose   through   a   series   of  
accomplishments:  by  integrating  one’s  ego  into  a  broader  community,  
or   allowing   the   “I”   to   become   part   of   a   “We”;   by   making   the   ego  
generative   (normally   through   sexual   procreation,   but   also   through  
works);   and   most   importantly   by   learning   how   to   synthesize   the  
conflicting  impulses  of  youth  into  a  whole  which,  for  better  or  worse,  
one  recognizes  as  one’s  self.  The  ultimate  objective  is  the  achievement  
of   individual   authority   and   autonomy,   an   achievement,   as  we   know,  
which  youth  frequently  claims  avant  le  mot,  as  though  it  were  a  genetic  
entitlement.  Antigone,  for  example,  engaged  in  a  passionate  defense  of  
«the  moral  certainty  of  the  young;  Romeo  and  Juliet  claim  the  authority  
of  their  passion  against  the  rigid  antagonism  of  their  parents»  (Spacks  
1981:  6).  In  his  famous  essay  on  «Family  Romances»,  Freud,  himself  a  
                                                                                                 
1   I   take   the   distinction   between   open   and   closed   societies   from  
Ferdinand  Tönnies’  classic  study  of  1887,  cfr.  Tönnies  1988.    
2  These  are  the  terms  with  which  Patricia  Meyer  Spacks,  in  her  study  of  
The  Adolescent  Idea  in  English  literature,  elaborates  Erikson’s  idea  of  youth  as  
testing  and  discovery,  cfr.  Spacks  1981:  3-­‐‑18.  
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child   of   an   open   society,   flatly   declared   that   «the   whole   progress   of  
society   rests   upon   the   opposition   between   successive   generations»  
(Spacks  1981:  5).  Of  course  one  of  the  easiest  ways  to  claim  authority  is  
to   attack   those   who   have   it,   so   that   it   is   hard   to   know   when   these  
passionate  youths  are  really  wedded  to  a  cause  or  are  just  using  it  as  a  
weapon  against  their  elders.  Either  way,  when  the  conflict  is  resolved,  
the  reward  is  a  new  space  of  belonging,  the  formation  of  a  new  home  
and  community.  
In  societies   that  are  relatively  closed,  by  contrast,  one  generation  
lives  much  like  the  one  that  preceded  it.  Here  the  bridge  of  youth  is  not  
the  construct  of  an  individual  so  much  as  a  joint  thoroughfare.  In  fact,  
it   is   hardly   that   different   from   a   road.   The   life   lying   ahead   appears  
more  or  less  scripted  beforehand,  answering  primarily  to  the  needs  of  a  
particular   tradition  and   trade.  Differences  between   the   terrain  on   this  
bank  and   that  are  not  always   that  marked,  with  children  often  acting  
like  mini-­‐‑adults  from  an  early  age  onward.  The  bridge  from  one  side  to  
the   other   need   not   be   dramatic,   signaling   a   rupture   or   instilling   an  
anxiety  of  destination.  
Whether  the  society  is  open  or  closed,  however,  the  security  of  the  
crossing   depends   essentially   on   the   stability   of   the   culture.   In   either  
event   transitions   remain   unproblematic   so   long   as   adolescents   face  
firm   and   clear   adult   options.   American   schoolchildren   rehearse   very  
early   for   their   steps   on   the   bridge,   planning   their   choices   for   college  
and  pondering  some  years  in  advance  the  lifestyles  and  professions  the  
system  deems  viable.  What  makes  the  bridge  crossing  precarious  is  an  
inordinate  discontinuity  between  this  side  of  the  river  and  that.  Usually  
the  mismatch  depends  on  unrealistic  expectations  formed  in  childhood  
(whether   through   a   failed   education   or   psychological  malformation).  
But   the   more   interesting   cases   of   discontinuity   arise   from   a   seismic  
change  in  terrain  when  one  is  already  on  the  bridge.  To  put  it  another  
way,   there   are   bridge-­‐‑ages   in   history   as   well   as   in   the   span   of   an  
individual  life,  for  example,  when  the  times  are  suddenly  convulsed—
by  war,  by  social  revolution,  by  radical  changes  of  political  regime,  and  
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so   on3.  When   the   two  meet—the   bridge-­‐‑age   of   youth   encountering   a  
bridge-­‐‑moment   in  history—the   situation   can  be   just   as  promising   for  
youth  as  it  is  disruptive.    
Historical  bridge-­‐‑experiences  tend  to  be  registered  collectively,  by  
an  entire  population,  and  most  intensely  by  the  young:  in  the  Romantic  
epoch   following   the   French   Revolution,   for   example;   or   in   the  
generation  of  1968;  or  with  the  collapse  of  East  European  communism;  
or   no   doubt,   too,   in   the   currently   war-­‐‑torn   countries   of   Iraq   and  
Afghanistan.  Those  whose  psyches  are  most  affected  by  these  moments  
of   cultural   insecurity   are   in   transit,   their   decisions   swayed   by  
everything   that   happens   between   the  world   they   are   leaving   behind  
and  the  world  they  planned  to  join.  The  young,  who  already  stand  on  
an  ethical  bridge,   find  their   insecurity  doubled  by  bridge  moments   in  
history,  their  footing  doubly  threatened  by  social  crisis.  
An   indication  of   this   syndrome  can  be   found   in   the  novel   called  
The   Bridge   over   the   Drina,   written   in   the   1940s   by   the   Nobel   Prize  
winner   (1961)   Ivo   Andric.   The   book   is   an   episodic,   historical   fiction  
relating  the  lives  of  Bosnians  over  the  course  of  four  centuries,  from  the  
building   of   that   bridge   in   Visegrad   by   the   Turks   (in   1571-­‐‑77)   to   the  
outbreak   of   World   War   I.   The   book   ends   with   the   story   of   a  
«generation  of  rebel  angels»  (Andric  1959:  232)  on  these  fringes  of  the  
Austro-­‐‑Hungarian   empire,   who   came   to   ruin   at   the   double   juncture  
they  faced  in  1914:  at  the  bridge  to  their  own  adulthood  and  the  bridge  
to  the  imagined  new  republics  of  central  Europe.    
These   were   the   first   children   of   Bosnian   peasants   and   petty  
artisans,  notes  Andric,  who  were  able  to  attend  universities  and,  from  
the   universities   and   schools   they   attended,   from   the   great   cities   of  
Vienna   and   Sarajevo,   «these   young  men   came   back   intoxicated  with  
that   feeling   of   proud   audacity   with   which   his   first   and   incomplete  
knowledge   fills  a  man,  and  carried  away  by   ideas  about   the  rights  of  
peoples   to   freedom   and   of   individuals   to   enjoyment   and   dignity»  
                                                                                                 
3  This   is  a  situation  over  and  beyond  personal  bridge-­‐‑experiences,  such  
as  a  death  in  the  family,  an  emigration  during  adolescence,  and  so  on.  
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(Andric   1959:   231).   Without   making   any   special   effort   of   their   own,  
continues  Andric,  these  young  men    
had  obtained   from   fate  …  a   free   entry   into   the  world  and   the  
great   illusion  of   freedom  …   there  was  not   one  of   them  who  did  
not  have  the  feeling  that  he  could  take  what  he  wished  [from  that  
world]  and  that  all  that  he  took  was  his.  Life  (that  word  comes  up  
very   often   in   their   conversation,   as   it   did   in   the   literature   and  
politics   of   the   time,   when   it   was   always   written   with   a   capital  
letter),  Life  stood  before  them  as  an  object,  as  a  field  of  action  for  
their   liberated   senses,   for   their   intellectual   curiosity   and   their  
sentimental  exploits,  which  knew  no   limits.  All   roads  were  open  
to  them,  onward  to  infinity.  (Ibid.:  232-­‐‑33)  
Andric’s  own   judgment  on   this  situation   (and  mind  you,  he  was  
one  of  them),  is  acerbically  recorded  as  follows:  «It  is  hard  to  imagine  a  
more  dangerous  manner  of   entering   into   life   or   a   surer  way   towards  
exceptional   deeds   or   total   disaster»   (ibid.:   233).   Indeed   when   one’s  
expectations  for  the  future  are  as  grand  as  these,   it   is  hard  to  imagine  
how   exceptional   deeds   can   even   be   kept   clear   from   total   disaster.   In  
this  young  generation   the  project   that  normally  guides   the  coming  of  
age  was   doubled,   and   historically   double-­‐‑crossed.   The   danger   lay   in  
conflating   a   program   for   self-­‐‑realization  with   a   program   for   national  
independence,   turning   the   two   into  one.  And  to  make  matters  worse,  
these   Bosnians   imagined   that   their   point   of   arrival   would   be   utterly  
antithetical  to  their  point  of  departure.    
To  be  sure,  all  human  generations  have  their  own  «illusions  with  
regard   to   civilization»,   writes   Andric;   «some   believe   that   they   are  
taking   part   in   its   upsurge,   others   that   they   are   witnesses   of   its  
extinction».  On  the  eve  of  this  War  the  Bosnian  generation    
was  richer  only  in  illusions….  It  had  the  feeling  both  of  lighting  
the   first   fires   of   one   new   civilization   and   extinguishing   the   last  
flickers  of  another  which  was  burning  out.  What  could  especially  
be  said  of  them  was  that  there  had  not  been  for  a  long  time  past  a  
generation  which  with  greater  boldness  had  dreamed  and  spoken  
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about  life,  enjoyment  and  freedom  and  which  had  received  less  of  
life,   suffered   worse,   laboured   harder   and   died   more   often   than  
had   this   one.   But   in   those   summer   days   of   1913   all   was   still  
undetermined,   unsure.   Everything   appeared   as   an   exciting   new  
game   on   that   ancient   bridge,   which   shone   in   the   moonlight   of  
those  July  nights,  clean,  young  and  unalterable,  strong  and  lovely  
in  its  perfection,  stronger  than  all  that  time  might  bring  and  men  
imagine  and  do.  (Ibid.:  233-­‐‑234)  
No  doubt  there  are  echoes  here  of   the  great  study  of  the  Austro-­‐‑
Hungarian   Empire   on   the   eve   of   the   War   called   The   Man   Without  
Qualities,   by  Robert  Musil,   and  perhaps   even  a   foretaste  of   studies   to  
come   of   the   particularities   of   the  war   generation4.   But   no  work   is   so  
specific   about   the   collusion   between   a   cultural   bridge-­‐‑moment   and   a  
bridge-­‐‑age  in  life  that  is  singularly  disposed  towards  it.  To  emphasize  
the   critical   nature   of   this   link   Andric   stages   these   young   Bosnians’  
conversations  about  their  future  on  a  bridge,  that  very  bridge  over  the  
Drina  that  once  brought  the  Muslim  empire  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face  with  Christian  
Europe.   But   like   that   bridge,   whose   political   function   had   for   some  
time   been   rendered   obsolete   by   a   railroad,   so   too   the   youth   of   this  
transitional  moment  was  destined  not   to  reach   its  goal.  Those  who  in  
1913  dreamed  «about  life,  enjoyment  and  freedom»  with  such  boldness  
were   the  very  same  people  who  «suffered  worse,   labored  harder  and  
died   more   often»   than   any   generation   before   it.   Their   bridge   led  
nowhere.  
Were  it  not  for  this  complication  we  would  have  only  one  side  of  
the  dialectics  of  youth.  We  would  have  that  ethos  described  in  Andric’s  
pages   which   is   so   redolent   of   D’Annunzio   and   Marinetti:   the   full-­‐‑
throttle   forward,   the   sanguine   propulsion   toward   self-­‐‑assertion,  
toward   seizing   each   occasion   for   the   furtherance   of   one’s   notions.  
Many  youths  incanted  such  tones  on  the  eve  of  the  Great  War  and  later  
recanted;  some  perdured  in  their  youthful  vein  their  whole  lives  long.  
The  passionate  commitment  to  change  is  only  one  half  of  the  dialectics  
                                                                                                 
4  For  example  Wohl  1979;  Fussell  2000;  Eksteins  1990.  
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of  a  bridge-­‐‑age   in  a  bridge-­‐‑moment  of   culture.   If  you   flip   it  over,   the  
overweening  enthusiasm  of  youth,   its   sentimental   intellectualism  and  
absolutism,   reveals   a   susceptibility   to   depression,   the   fragility   of  
youth’s   faith,   its   quickness   to   sense   defeat.   Being   on   the   bridge,   I  
contend,   is  a  bi-­‐‑polar  experience.  Some  youths  keep   their  eyes  on   the  
envisioned  bank,  some  waver  and  totter,  some  even  jump  off.  The  most  
eloquent   rhetoric   of   youth   recognizes   the   suspended   condition,  
registering  the  conflict  as  conflict.    
The   bridge-­‐‑moment   of   1914   collapsed   under   the   burdens   it  was  
made  to  bear.  The  greater  the  promise  it  extended,  the  more  uncertain  
the  situation  ahead.  A  similar  scenario  occurs  in  the  years  following  the  
French  revolution,  an  event  which  inspires  the  youth  of  Europe  to  exalt  
its  bridge-­‐‑like  nature  in  the  most  fervid  manner,  filling  the  shores  with  
the  cries  of  a  Byron  and  Keats  and  Hölderlin  and  Shelley,  all  intent  on  
an   ideal   shore.   These  writings   bridge   two   bridge-­‐‑experiences:   one   of  
youth  and  one  of  culture.  And  we  find  it  again  in  the  late  1960s,  where  
it  was  mainly  music  that  functioned  this  way,  and  where  it   is  hard  to  
imagine   its   lyrics   being   written   by   anyone   over   twenty-­‐‑five,   and  
neither  ten  years  earlier  nor  ten  years  later.  If  such  works  of  the  young  
did  not  articulate  two  bridge-­‐‑ages,  they  would  not  hold  half  the  interest  
that   they   do.   Nor  would   they   hold   that   interest   if   their   authors   had  
crossed   the   bridge   without   trauma.   They   would   not   have   been   true  
spokesmen  of  youth.  
In   the   post-­‐‑revolutionary   age,   a   young   man   who   undergoes   a  
syndrome  similar  to  that  of  Andric’s  generation  is  Ugo  Foscolo.  Born  in  
1778,  he  composes  his  epistolary  novel,  Ultime   lettere  di   Iacopo  Ortis  at  
age   nineteen   in   the   wake   of   the   clamorous   opportunities   that   the  
emperor   Napoleon   had   created   for   a   political   revolution   in   Europe.  
Like  many  other  intellectuals,  Foscolo  was  swept  away  by  the  prospect  
of  a  new,  non-­‐‑aristocratic   form  of  political  organization   that   could  be  
instituted  on  the  pattern  of  the  French.  But  instead,  his  letters  of  Iacopo  
Ortis  record  cataclysmic  disappointment.  They  register  a  young  man’s  
progress   from  extreme  existential  and  political  hope   to  embitterment,  
denunciation,   and   self-­‐‑despair.   The   issue   once   again   is   a   failed  
conflation   of   personal   and   national   self-­‐‑realization.   Iacopo   Ortis’s  
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psychology   evolves   from   the   social   bond   of   me-­‐‑and-­‐‑them,   in   which  
political   aspirations   are   rooted,   to   an   existential   opposition   of   me-­‐‑
against-­‐‑them   to  which   a   group-­‐‑bonding   youth   so   easily   reverts  when  
disappointed.  One  happens   in   these   letters   is   a  non-­‐‑passage   from   the  
“me”  to  the  “us”  by  which  an  adolescent  joins  an  adult  community  and  
also  politicizes  his  personal  hopes.    
In   more   practical   terms,   Foscolo   had   to   have   invested   an  
enormous  amount  of  hope   in   the  occupation  of   Italy   to  have  been   so  
undone   by   its   outcome.   In   1797  Napoleon   liberates  Venice,   Foscolo’s  
homeland,   from   its   ruling   oligarchy,   to   the   jubilation   of   many,   but  
barely  five  months  later  cedes  it  to  Austria.  A  political  bridge  had  been  
erected  only  to  be  torn  down.  That  is  when,  in  October  1797,  Ortis  goes  
into  exile  and  starts  registering  his  subjectivity  in  these  letters.  Within  a  
year   and  a  half   he  has   committed   suicide.  Clearly   the  young  Foscolo  
had   a  more   ideal   conception   of   politics   than   did   his   hero  Napoleon,  
and  quickly  concluded  that  politics   is  «una  perpetua  ruota  di  servitù,  
di   licenza   e   di   tirannia»   (a   perpetual   cycle   of   servitude,   license,   and  
tyranny,  Foscolo  1981:  93-­‐‑94/92)5.  There  is  only  one  coherent  response  
to   this   situation   as   far   as   Ortis   is   concerned:   «Fuggirò   il   vitupèrio  
morendo   ignoto»   (I   shall   flee   from   shame   by   dying   unknown,   ibid.:  
94/92).  He  experienced   the  political  dead-­‐‑end  as  a  personal  death.  As  
his   political   and   sentimental   hopes   are   dashed,   the   once   sanguine  
activist  of  the  future  finds  himself  stranded  between  all  that  he  has  left  
behind   and   an   ever   more   distant   other   shore.   Having   idealized   his  
future   as   a   full-­‐‑fledged  Venetian,   enjoying   a   new  homeland,   he   now  
laments  his   lost   childhood  —  «quel   fuoco  celeste   che  nel   tempo  della  
fresca   mia   gioventù   spargeva   raggi   su   tutte   le   cose   che   mi   stavano  
intorno,  mentre   oggi   vo   brancolando   in   una   vota   oscurità!»   (celestial  
fire  which  in  the  time  of  my  first  youth  illuminated  everything  around,  
while   today   I   am   groping   in   vacuity   and   darkness,   ibid.:   98/97).  
Another   broken   bridge   severs   him   from   the   group   whose   goals   he  
thought  were  shared:  «O  amico  mio!  ciascun  individuo  è  nemico  nato  
                                                                                                 
5  Page  references  to  the  English  translations  will  hereafter  follow  those  
of  the  original.  
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della  Società,  perchè  la  Società  è  necessaria  nemica  degli  individui»  (O  
my  friend,  every  individual  is  a  born  enemy  of  society,  because  society  
is  of  necessity  hostile  to  individuals,  ibid.:  107/108).  Like  so  many  of  his  
age,   the   most   fervent   political   believer   becomes   power’s   most   bitter  
critic.    
It  could  be  that  Foscolo’s  generation  (like  that  of  1968,  the  travails  
of  which  are  the  subject  of  a  line  of  Italian  films  from  La  meglio  gioventù,  
2003,  to  Mio  fratello  è  figlio  unico,  2007)  over-­‐‑invested  in  the  idea  of  self-­‐‑
determination.  Two  years  after  his   letters  were  published,   John  Keats  
had   his   own   rhetoric   for   this,   claiming   that   the   world   was   nothing  
other   than   a   «vale   of   Soul-­‐‑making».   What   does   he   mean   by   Soul-­‐‑
making?   The  millions   of   brains   and   intellects   that  wander   the   earth,  
Keats  explains,  «are  not  Souls  till  they  acquire  identities,  till  each  one  is  
personally   itself»6.   The   key   word   is   “identity,”   the   acquisition   of  
identity,   the  very  proof  of  a  Soul,  and  the  bank  sought  by  youth.  It   is  
also  a  notion  that,  two  hundred  years  later,  we  are  still  questioning.    
A  man   three   years   younger   than  Keats,  Giacomo  Leopardi,  was  
thoroughly   disabused   of   all   rhetorical   naiveté   concerning   the  
mechanisms  at  work  in  identity  formation.  At  age  twenty-­‐‑six  he  looked  
around  him  and  concluded  that  his  fellow  Italians  did  not  possess  such  
an   identity,  nor  were   likely   to  acquire   it   in   the   course  of   the   century.  
Even   less   did   they   show   signs   of   that   collective   association   called   a  
nation.  Sopra   i   costumi   degli   italiani,   from   1824,   stipulates   that   Italians  
lack   the   civic   values,   communal   beliefs   and   public   virtues   that   unify  
the   citizens   of   France,   Germany,   England,   and   Russia.   Italians   have  
usanze  but  not  costumi  (usages,  but  not  mores),  primarily  because  they  
lack  an  authoritative,  social  elite  to  discipline  their  impulses.  But  they  
are  cynical  and  disillusioned  people  for  two  other  reasons:  (1)  they  lose  
their   childhood   earlier   than   others,   and   (2)   they   do   not   find  ways   to  
«carry  it  over»  into  adult  domains  (Leopardi  1991:  47-­‐‑59).  Now  anyone  
who   knows   Leopardi’s   work   is   aware   that   he   viewed   the   exit   from  
childhood  as  a  most  desolate  of  prospects,  for  it  destroyed  everything  
                                                                                                 
6  John  Keats,  Letter  to  the  George  Keatses,  21  April  1819;  qtd.  in  Cousineau  
1994:  157.  
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that  made  life  worth  living:  vivacity,  enthusiasm,  imagination,  the  pull  
of  illusion  and  the  spirit  of  play.  His  writing  addresses  neither  one  side  
of   the  bridge  nor   the  other;   it  ponders   the  bridge,  unfolding   the   tragic  
nature  of  the  crossing.  And  yet  there  are  notable  exceptions  to  the  rule.  
The  cultures  of  ancient  Greece  and  Rome  succeeded   in  pulling  youth  
across   the   bridge,   by   sublimating   its   illusions   and   dreams   into   firm  
creeds,   ideals  and  mores,   into  grand  visions  and  art.  By   this   logic   the  
only  viable   passage   into   adulthood   is   one   that   transports   the   traits   of  
childhood  with  it,  instituting  various  new  “reasoned”  versions  of  play,  
or   reasoned   plays   of   the   imagination.  Aside   from  Greece   and   Rome,  
Leopardi   commends   only   the   Italian   Renaissance   and   the   French  
Revolution   for   re-­‐‑injecting   some   basic   illusory   convictions   and  
youthful   enthusiasm   into   the   ways   of   Europe,   producing   rare  
harmonies   of   individuality   and   sociality,   of   personal   and   collective  
good7.  
The   identity   formation   aspired   to   by   Foscolo  was,   in   Leopardi’s  
estimation,   too  distant  a  goal   for   the  peoples  of   Italy.   In   fact,   it  was  a  
losing  proposition   for  all  nations  of  Europe   in   the  19th  century.  While  
Leopardi   clearly   believed   that   he   was   living   in   the   age   of   the  
individual,   he   believed   that   the   ideology   of   individualism   only  
fostered   atomized   sameness,   nations   that   in   truth   were   only  
aggregated   masses,   whose   cultural   specificities   were   destined   to  
disappear.  Prime  responsibility   for   this  paradox   lay  with   increasingly  
commercial  and  centralized  new  forms  of  cultural  mediation  (what  we  
now  call   the  mass  media),  but   the  development  was  also   inextricably  
tied  to  the  principles  of  individualism  that  this  mediation  served.  The  
overvaluation  of  the  so-­‐‑called  individual  identity,  to  which  the  bridge  
of  youth   is  often  expected   to   lead,  was  part  of   the  reason   for  cultural  
disaggregation,   for   it  built   egoism  without   true   forms  of  bonding.  As  
the   century   wears   on,   this   ideology   of   individualism   comes   under  
increasing  philosophical  pressure.  One  simple  reason,  perhaps,   is  that  
                                                                                                 
7  On  this   theme  see  the  selections  from  Leopardi’s  Zibaldone  contained  
in   Leopardi   1992,   as   well   as   Rigoni’s   excellent   discussion   introducing   the  
anthology.  
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the  pursuit  of  “authenticity”  had  first   to  contend  with  something  that  
the   century   made   much   more   concrete   and   historically   ubiquitous:  
inauthenticity   (the   idea   that   things   are   standing   in   the   way   of   one’s  
being   what   one   is).   This   may   have   been   what   Foscolo   and   Andric’s  
youth  were  sensing,  namely,  that  the  very  history  that  was  expected  to  
ground  one’s  adult   identity  was   impersonal,  mechanical,  and  alien   to  
the  individual.  
In   the   heyday   of   psychological   and   sociological   research   at   the  
beginning  of   the  20th   century,   the  problem  was  apparent  everywhere.  
In  the  1920s,   the  author  of  The  Man  Without  Qualities  writes  a  satirical  
story  about   that  component  of  psychic  adulthood  called  character.   Its  
protagonist,   a   man   accused   of   lacking   such   character   his   whole   life  
long,  finally  says  this  in  defense  of  himself  (connecting  his  problem  to  
the  system  he  belongs  to):  «I  am  convinced»,  he  reflects,    
that   the   development   of   character   is   connected  with   the   way  
war   is  waged  …  and   that  nowadays,   for   this   very   reason,   it   can  
only   be   found   among   savages.   For   those  who   fight  with   knives  
and   spears  need   character   to   come  out  on   top.  But  what  kind  of  
character,   however   resolute,   can   stand   up   against   tanks,   flame  
throwers  and  clouds  of  poison  gas?!8  (Musil  1987:  113)  
In   addition   to  whatever   character   one  might   accrue   by   the   time  
one   is   an   adult,   one   must   also   take   account   of   at   least   a   half-­‐‑dozen  
others:    
a   sexual,   a   national,   a   state,   a   class,   and   a   geographical  
character  to  boot,  you  have  a  handwriting  character,  a  character  of  
the  lines  in  your  hand,  of  the  shape  of  your  skull,  and  if  possible,  a  
character   that   derives   from   the   constellation   of   the   stars   at   the  
                                                                                                 
8   Translation   slightly   revised.   Failing   to   show   character   as   an  
adolescent,  Musil’s  protagonist  eventually  takes  to  modeling  himself  on  roles  
dramatized  in  the  plays  and  novels  that  he  reads,  none  of  which  proves  any  
more   viable   to   the   ethical   demands   of   life   in   the   20th   century   than   the  
throwers  of  spears.  
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moment  of  your  birth.  All  that  is  too  much  for  me.  I  never  know  
which  of  my  characters  to  follow.  (Ibid.:  112)  
This  man  without  character  recommends  that  we  give  up  all  this  
talk  about  character  and  think  of  humanity  a   little  more  scientifically,  
in   terms   of   discipline   and   statistics.   Could   it   be,   wonders   Musil’s  
narrator,   that   this  much-­‐‑maligned  man   is   a   forerunner   of   an   entirely  
new  way  of  being  human?    
Perhaps;   but   in   the   meantime   the   epoch   had   to   deal   with   the  
maladjustments  and  frustrations  that  are  so  well  described  by  another  
observer   of   the   impersonality   of   accrued   identity,   Luigi   Pirandello.  
What  is  his  Sei  personaggi  in  cerca  d’autore  (1921)  if  not  an  attack  on  the  
notion   of   viable   adult   identity?  Although   each   character   in   that   play  
has   a   very   clear   face,   and   destinies   as   immutable   as   those   of   Greek  
heroes,   they   all   suffer   from   the   fact   that   their   story   has   not   been  
authored,  nor  authorized.  For  our  purposes  the  most  interesting  case  is  
that   of   the   Son,   a  man   in   his   early   twenties  who   normally  would   be  
expected   to   have   developed   an   identity   by   this   time.   But   that   never  
happened.  While   the  Father   and   the  Mother  and   the  Daughter   in   the  
play   are   oppressed   by   the   possession   of   a   character   they   did   not  
choose,  the  Son  suffers  from  the  inability  to  develop  into  any  character  
at  all.  His  dramatic  fate  is  thus  to  cry  out  from  time  to  time  throughout  
the  play,  «Non  ho  proprio  nulla,  io,  da  fare  qui!  Me  ne  lasci  andare  …  
Io   non   rappresento   nulla!»   (Pirandello   1969:   68,   73).   The   speechless,  
unachieved   Son   is   stuck   on   the   bridge,   utterly   suspended.   In   this  
moratorium  condition,   there   is  no  plot   that  he  can  belong   to.  And,   in  
the  meantime,  while  an  adult  plot  is  sought,  Pirandello  plots  the  non-­‐‑
plot.    
For  all  its  living  complexities,  the  problem  of  the  son  comes  down  
to  a  problem  of  writing,  of  bridging  an   inner   intention  with  an  outer  
expression.  Passing  into  adulthood  means  giving  a  relatively  coherent  
shape  to  all  that  is  seething  within  or,  if  nothing  else,  of  creating  a  bond  
between   the   fluid,   dynamic   inner   self   and   the   outer,   enfranchised  
persona  of  a  public  community.  The  resulting  identity  would  have  the  
shape  of  a  smoother  or  rougher  connection,  the  structure  of  two  banks  
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of   a   river   cemented   together.   The   characters   I   have   discussed   so   far  
have   rather   more   the   look   of   a   broken   bridge.   Now   if   the   bridge   is  
language—an  adequate  rhetoric  to  bridge  A  to  B—then  it  follows  that  
writings  of  the  young  can  only  be  efforts  at  self-­‐‑construction.  The  last  
case  I  will  discuss  is  one  example  of  one  such  text  of  youth,  the  written  
log  of  a  young  man  who  was  on  the  bridge  as  he  wrote.    
Carlo   Michelstaedter,   the   author   of   a   great   study   in   nihilistic  
idealism  called  La  persuasione  e   la  rettorica   (1910),  was  perfectly  poised  
to  make  a  move   into  adulthood   in  1908,  when,  at  age   twenty-­‐‑one,  he  
left  home   to   attend  university   in  Florence.   Florence  was  an   ideal   city  
for  this  Italian  from  the  Austrian  empire  to  acquire  a  sense  of  personal  
and   national   belonging,   exposing   him   to   the   productive   examples   of  
other   progressive   young   Italians   like   Papini,   Prezzolini,   and   the  
industrious   vociani,   and   indirectly   even   the   Futurists.   His   itinerary,  
from  a   type  of  cultural  exile   in   the   irredentist   region  of  Trieste   to   the  
homeland,   would   seem   to   have   held   promise.   But   Michelstaedter’s  
passage   was   not   successful.   Instead   of   concluding   his   adult  
apprenticeship  he  took  his  own  life  the  day  he  finished  his  university  
thesis,   the   same   work   published   by   Adelphi   as   La   persuasione   e   la  
rettorica,  at  age  twenty-­‐‑three9.  Metaphorically  speaking,  he  jumped  off  
the  bridge.  
Michelstaedter   belonged   to   the   same   generation   as   Andric’s  
young  Bosnians,  but  he  never  made  their  investment  in  a  distant  shore  
of   personal   and   national   self-­‐‑realization.   His   crisis,   instead   of   being  
historical   (where   one   condition   of   life   stands   on   the   point   of   giving  
way   to   another),   was   cultural.   The   bank   from   which   he   started   his  
youthful  crossing  was  already  fragmented,  broken  into  different  ethnic  
and   linguistic  groups  not   endowed  with  a   solid  model  of  paternal  or  
political  authority.  Michelstaedter’s  childhood  was  spent   in  an   Italian  
                                                                                                 
9   Michelstaedter   1982.   This   work   has   been   published   in   a   cluttered  
English  edition  by  Russell  Scott  Valentino,  Cinzia  Sartini  Blum  and  David  J.  
Depew  (2004).  Translations  will  be  revised  and  referenced  immediately  after  
the  original  citations.  An  excellent  alternative  to  this  translation  is  harder  to  
find:  Michelstaedter  2007.    
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town  (Gorizia)  that  had  been  culturally  and  politically  administered  by  
the  Austrians   for  more   than   a   century;  where   this   Italian   frequented  
German   schools   while   belonging   to   a   community   of   liberal   Jews.  
Unlike   the   crisis   of   Foscolo   and   the   young   Serbs   in   Bosnia,  
characterizing   a  moratorium   between   adolescence   and   adulthood,   the  
multicultural  society  of  Michelstaedter  put  adolescence  itself  already  in  
crisis.  The  bridge  in  front  of  this  Triestine  youth  was  up  in  the  air  from  
the  start:   there  was  no  clear   idea  of  where   it   should   lead,  or  where   it  
should  set  out  from.    
In   cases   like   this,  where   the   discontinuities   are   synchronic   even  
before   they   are   diachronic,   we   recognize   the   extent   to   which   the  
passage  of  youth  can  be  wracked  by  a  series  of  conflicts  independent  of  
age:   the   opposition   between   urban   and   rural   lifestyles,   class  
antagonisms,   social   mobility,   the   issues   of   gender   identification,  
conflicting  ideologies,  and  geocultural  contrasts  within  a  nation  that  is  
one  only  in  name.  At  certain  times  and  places  such  differences  can  exist  
on   one   and   the   same   street;   and   still   they   must   be   bridged   by   any  
person  who  takes  them  as  the  raw  material  of  personal  identity.  
Michelstaedter,  instead  of  passing  from  one  bank  of  confused  and  
uncertain  youth  to  another  of  ostensibly  firm  adult  identity,  records  the  
very  condition  of  between-­‐‑ness  which  irremediably  marks  the  passage.  
His   is   an   exasperated   scriptorial   moratorium   between   sites   that   are  
only   hypothetical   unities.   Unlike   the   bridge   of   more   homogenous  
youths  on  the  eve  of  the  War,  Michelstaedter’s  is  one  that  he  wanders  
alone,   without   company,   and   with   no   clear   end   in   view.   And   he  
legitimates  this  crisis  by  projecting  it  onto  human  subjectivity  at  large.    
His   dissertation   opens   with   the   very   personal,   peremptory  
declaration,   «So   che   voglio   e   non   ho   cosa   io   voglia»   (I   know   that   I  want  
and  do  not  have  what  I  want,  Michelstaedter  1982:  39/8).  The  dilemma  
is  not  that  «I  want  something,  but  do  not  have  it».  It  is  that  «I  desire,  I  
know  that  I  desire,  that  I  exist  in  a  condition  of  wanting,  and  that  this  
wanting   cannot   be   appeased».  Michelstaedter   illustrates   his   point   by  
way  of  a  metaphor:    
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Un  peso  pende  ad  un  gancio,  e  per  pender  soffre  che  non  può  
scendere:  non  può  uscire  dal  gancio,  poiché  quant’è  peso  pende  e  
quanto  pende  dipende….  La  sua  vita  è  questa  mancanza  della  sua  
vita.   Quando   esso   non  mancasse   più   di   niente—ma   fosse   finito,  
perfetto:   possedesse   sé   stesso,   esso   avrebbe   finito   d’esistere….   Il  
peso  non  può  mai  esser  persuaso.  (Ibid.:  39-­‐‑40)  
  
A  weight  hangs  on  a  hook,  and   in  hanging  suffers   that   it   cannot  
fall:  it  cannot  get  off  the  hook,  for  being  a  weight  it  is  suspended,  
and  in  being  suspended  it  is  dependent…..  Its  life  is  this  lack  of  its  
life.  If  it  lacked  nothing  whatsoever—but  were  finished,  perfect:  if  
it  possessed  itself,  it  would  cease  to  exist….  The  weight  can  never  be  
persuaded.  (8-­‐‑9)  
The  weight   cannot  be   itself,   “what   it   is,”  without  being  held  up,  
without   being   stopped   from   reaching   a  place   that  would   satisfy   it.   It  
represents  the  eternal  bridge  of  desire,  the  link  between  self  and  other,  
or   self   and   world,   whose   union   is   the   very   objective   of   youth.   This  
bridge-­‐‑condition  is  an  experience  of  distance  and  tension,  of  not-­‐‑being  
and  not  reaching,  a  situation  particularly  dramatic  for  youth  in  periods  
of   cultural   multiplicity,   transition   or   crisis.   To   borrow   the   words   of  
Simone   Weil,   it   amounts   to   a   realization   that   ultimately   humans  
possess   nothing   in   the  world   «except   the   power   to   say   ‘I’»   (Ibid.:71),  
and   that   this   “I”   on   which   we   build   our   claims   is   a   shifter   without  
substance.    
Like  Weil,  Michelstaedter  generalizes  the  dilemma  to  humanity  at  
large.  La   persuasione   e   la   rettorica   provides   an   elaborate   proof   for   this  
lack  of  identity  as  the  only  real  basis  for  self-­‐‑possession,  as  a  paradoxical  
authenticity  variously  propounded  by  the  teachings  of  the  Buddha,  by  
Jesus  of  Nazareth,  Socrates,  Leopardi,  and  the  Greek  tragedians.  To  be  
human  is  to  be  on  an  eternal  and  interminable  bridge  crossing.  This  is  
that  metaphysics  of  desire  which  culture  can  only  mitigate,  providing  
practical   resolutions   in   the   form   of   a   binding   profession,   a   joint   life  
with  a  loved  person,  a  secure  and  comforting  lifestyle.  But  all  these,  for  
Michelstaedter,   are   the   trappings   of   “rhetoric”—an   inadequate  
linguistic  practice.  His  persuasion,  instead,  the  inner  conviction  of  self,  
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remains   voiceless,   for   it   recognizes   that   the   possession   of   oneself   in  
things  outside  oneself  is  impossible,  that  one  is  suspended  instead  on  a  
bridge,  a  non-­‐‑place  perhaps,  but  more  firmly  one’s  own  than  the  places  
on  either  side.    
Only  youth   can   speak   this  way,   even   if  what   it   says   is  perfectly  
true.  With  its  inbred  yearning,  its  predilection  for  poetry,  longing,  and  
unfulfillment,   its   stylistic   experiments   and   self-­‐‑projections,   youth   can  
readily   declare   the   permanence   of   such   a   condition,  which   other   ages  
cannot  live  in.  This  is  what  both  György  Lukács  and  Walter  Benjamin  
called   the   «metaphysics   of   youth»,   which   could   also   be   called   a  
metaphysics  of   the   soul,   and   it  never   establishes   a   reign  on   earth.  At  
most   it   can   create   spaces   for   itself   in   the   interstices   between   one  
experience  and  another,  in  the  separation  between  the  near  and  the  far  
banks  of   a   river.   It   is   a   type  of  homeless   interregnum,   to  which  even  
Iacopo   Ortis,   after   all   his   romantic   dreams,   is   ultimately   committed.  
«Così  nel  mio  furore»,  as  he  concludes,  «mi  prostendo  su  la  polvere  a  
scongiurare   orrendamente   un   Dio   che   non   conosco»   (and   so   in   my  
frenzy  …  I  throw  myself  down  in  the  dust  horribly  beseeching  a  God  
whom  I  do  not  know,  Foscolo  1981:  109/110)10.  «Se  tu  mi  concedevi  una  
patria»,   he   cries   to   the   same   unknowable   divinity,   «io   avrei   speso   il  
mio   ingegno   e   il  mio   sangue   tutto  per   lei»   (If   you  had  granted  me   a  
homeland,   I   would   have   spent   all   my   intellect   and  my   blood   on   its  
behalf,  ibid.:  131/135);  but  that  homeland  was  not  to  be  reached.  Of  the  
real   life   he   tried   so   hard   to   achieve   he   can   only   say   this,   «io   non   la  
conosco  se  non  nel  sentimento  del  dolore»  (I  know  it  only  in  the  feeling  
of  grief,  ibid.:  113/114)  
This  kind  of  writing,  protracting  the  expanse  of  a  bridge  that  most  
adjusted   adults   step   off,   is   a   crystallization   of   the   age   of   youth.   If  
mature  writers  possess   the  proper  distance   to  characterize   this   state  of  
mind,  contextualizing  its  crossing  in  a  broader  landscape  of  life,  those  
who  speak  to  youth  in  their  own  voice  tend  to  make  a  hyperbole  of  this  
                                                                                                 
10  The  invocation  of  an  “unknown  God”  is  a  familiar  theme  of  youth.  Cf.  
Nietzsche’s  youthful  poem  To  an  Unknown  God. 
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same   condition.   In   a   sense   they   even   reject   the   crossing,   eternalizing  
the   voice   of   a   youth   they   never   surpassed.   Those   speaking   from   a  
bridge   see   their   youth   as   an   absolute   state,   not   a   transitional   one,  
adamantly   presenting   its   suspension   as   a   selfless   condition   of  
authenticity.   Where   adult   writers   can   describe   the   configuration   of  
solid  bridges,  this  kind  of  youth  reveals  the  bridge  as  both  an  act  and  
an  art   of   construction,   secretly   abhorring   completion.   It   is   an   art   of   a  
somewhere  whose  authority  is  nowhere,  a  somewhere  that  is  nowhere  
sanctioned.  Paradoxical   though   it  may  seem,  where  youth   is  a  bridge  
to  nowhere,  there  its  voice  rings  out  most  dramatically.    
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